Abstract-The concept of smart metering allows real-time measurement of power demand which in turn is expected to result in more efficient energy use and better load balancing. However, finely granular measurements reported by smart meters can lead to starkly increased exposure of sensitive information, including various personal attributes and activities. Even though several security solutions have been proposed in recent years to address this issue, most of the existing solutions are based on publickey cryptographic primitives, such as homomorphic encryption and elliptic curve digital signature algorithms which are ill-suited for the resource constrained smart meters. On the other hand, to address the computational inefficiency issue, some maskingbased solutions have been proposed. However, these schemes cannot ensure some of the imperative security properties, such as consumer's privacy and sender authentication. In this paper, we first propose a lightweight and privacy-friendly maskingbased spatial data aggregation scheme for secure forecasting of power demand in smart grids. Our scheme only uses lightweight cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions and exclusive-OR operations. Subsequently, we propose a secure billing solution for smart grids. As compared with existing solutions, our scheme is simple and can ensure better privacy protection and computational efficiency, which are essential for smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
MART grids are expected to enhance the efficiency of current power grids by using advanced digital information and communication technology. The combined volatility of both power supply and power demand is a growing problem that needs to be solved by the smart grids. Unlike water or gas, electricity is not easily or economically storeable in large quantities with current technologies. Therefore power grids are required to maintain a balance between power production and demand across short time scales. To ensure smart load balancing between production and demand, the deployment of smart meters is being pursued by many countries. The smart meters measure and report power consumption on a regular basis. This feature facilitates better power consumption monitoring, control and prediction, which in turn results in cost savings to both the power suppliers and consumers, as well as an immense reduction in the carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere [1] . To achieve these objectives, grid operators require effective spatial data aggregation schemes, where an aggregator periodically aggregates the electricity consumption of a group of consumers in a geographical region, each equipped with a smart meter. This consumption data may be used by the utility to dynamically update its prices in order to implement demand-side management. In addition, the aggregated consumption data may be used for supplydemand management, for example, by ramping production up or down as needed. These management features are particularly important in the context of increasing penetration of renewable energy sources (such as solar panels and wind turbines) in power grids across the world, given their inherent variability.
While smart meters offer some clear benefits, accurate and fine-grained measurements of household energy consumption trigger serious privacy concerns [2] , [3] . In this regard, fine-grained smart meter data may reveal an user's presence/absence in his/her house, which electrical appliances they are using at any moment, or even their daily habits at home. Since the usage of smart meters is essential for better supply and demand management in smart grids, it is important to develop technologies that reconcile privacy with the desired utility and functionality of smart meters.
A. Related Work
Over the last decade, some interesting data aggregation schemes have been proposed under various settings (e.g., smart metering systems [4] - [25] , and [34] - [38] , vehicle-togrid networks [39] , and wireless sensors networks [40] ). To tackle the privacy issues in smart grids, a number of research results have been proposed in recent years. These can be divided into two categories: public-key-based (such as homomorphic encryption based) schemes and maskingbased schemes. We first consider the existing public-key-based schemes followed by the existing masking-based schemes, and elaborate on their strengths and weaknesses. In 2010, Garcia and Jacobs [4] proposed a multi-party computation protocol that allows a number of smart meters in a locality 1556-6013 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
to compute a partial aggregation of their data without revealing their individual measurements by taking advantage of Paillier homomorphic encryption [5] . However, this scheme lacks efficiency in terms of computation and communication overheads. In addition, due to the malleability of homomorphic encryption, this scheme is also vulnerable to data forgery attacks. Similarly, Lu et al. [6] designed a privacy-preserving data aggregation protocol using the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem, which also causes higher computation overhead on entities like smart meters. Liang et al. [7] proposed a usagebased dynamic pricing scheme for smart grids by using a fully homomorphic technique devised by Naehring et al. [8] .
Fully homomorphic techniques are difficult to implement with current computing resources which limits the practical applicability of this scheme. Chia-Mu et al. [9] introduced a ring signature based scheme to protect users' usage profile. However, the computational cost increases with the size of the ring. Liu et al. [10] have proposed an aggregation scheme based on blind signatures. However, this scheme does not protect the privacy of the consumer's usage data profile. Also, Zhang et al. [11] have proposed a self-certified signature scheme without considering usage data integrity and consumer's privacy. Sui et al. [12] have designed an incentivebased data aggregation scheme which is constructed with the assumption of an anonymity network, where the sources of usage reports are anonymous. Therefore, it is hard to identify any smart meter or any communication failure. Besides, in this scheme the aggregator is unable to verify the legitimacy of the smart meter and the usage data, which may lead to forgery attacks. Li and Luo [13] , Li et al. [14] introduced a hop-byhop technique for data aggregation in smart grids. However, aggregation in the presence of node failures as well as the methodology to construct the aggregation tree have not been explicitly addressed. In addition, as shown in [15] , the schemes presented in [13] and [14] cannot ensure privacy during smart metering and reveal the identity of the users. Also, the public key signatures used in these schemes result in higher computation cost. A few more homomorphic encryption based schemes have been proposed in [15] - [19] . However, in these schemes, the smart meter is not authenticated during data aggregation. Thus, a dishonest or fake smart meter may falsify the data, leading to inaccurate aggregation result. Besides, these schemes does not support consumer's privacy. Also, the data aggregation schemes presented in [17] and [18] do not ensure data integrity. In [19] Jo et al. proposed two data aggregation schemes based on Paillier homomorphic encryption and elliptic curve digital signature algorithms (ECDSA), respectively. While their ECDSA-based scheme can ensure sender authentication, the usage report transmitted by each smart meter SM i reveals it's identity ID SM i , which is fixed for all transactions. Therefore, an adversary can easily identify if the usage data is from the same consumer's end and link ID SM i to an actual user. Thus, the scheme presented in [19] cannot ensure anonymity of a consumer. Apart from the schemes above, a few more public-key-based data aggregation protocols have been introduced in recent years [30] , [31] . In [30] a discrete logarithm problem (DLP)-based data aggregation scheme is introduced, in which the authors allows a substation to access private data using a shared key. Hence, this scheme cannot ensure strong privacy. Abdullah et al. [31] proposed a lattice based homomorphic data aggregation scheme.However, lattice-based encryption systems incur a huge computational and communication cost. Besides, the scheme presented in [31] does not support individual sender authentication and consumer's privacy features. Hence, the security solution in [31] is not suitable for smart grids. Koo et al. [34] investigated some of the state-of-the-art data aggregation schemes in smart grids, where they found that most of the existing solutions cannot ensure authenticity of the metering data and consumer's privacy. Vahedi et al. [35] recently proposed a privacy preserving data aggregation scheme for smart grids using ECDSA. Even though their scheme can guarantee authentication of the source and integrity of the usage data. However, in their scheme consumers reveal their identity, and hence cannot ensure consumer's privacy. The solution in [36] preserves the usage privacy thanks to the property of bilinear pairings. However, this solution incurs high communication and computational overheads due to the generation and distribution of keys and of the encrypted measurements of each involved entity. Additional overheads come from random public parameters that should be signed to ensure their integrity and authenticity. Next, we consider the existing masking-based data aggregation schemes. In 2011, Kursawe et al. [20] suggested a set of masking-based schemes for privacy in smart grids. In their schemes, the authors utilized the concept of Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) groups and bilinear mapping for checking the correctness of the shared masking value, which are computationally expensive and ill-suited for resource constrained smart meters. Besides, it lacks the ability to deal with a dishonest or malicious smart meter that falsifies usage data in order to make the final aggregation result incorrect. Also, during data aggregation, the smart meters reveals their identity, which is fixed for all sessions. Thus, this scheme cannot ensure consumer's privacy, where an adversary can easily comprehend and target a specific user and reveal the consumer's activity through human-factor-aware data aggregation (HDA) attacks [25] . , Shi et al. [21] presented a method that combines masking and distributed differential privacy using noise. However, in their scheme the aggregator can do partial decryption of the meter reading. Hence, the scheme presented in [21] cannot ensure the desired privacy. In [22] , Danezis et al. proposed another masking-based scheme where their objective was to examine the usage of complex functions on smart meters by splitting them into Boolean circuits. However, their approach costs more computing rounds and also negatively affects the bandwidth and latency. Moreover, in this scheme each smart meter sends its usage data without any integrity protection. Furthermore, the schemes presented in [21] and [22] cannot guarantee sender authentication and the consumer's privacy. Recently, Knirsch et al. [23] proposed a masking-based approach for data aggregation . Their scheme utilizes the concept of homomorphic hashing for checking the correctness of the shared secrets. However, this construction has a couple of issues. First, it is complicated to implement and computationally expensive to compute. Second, it cannot ensure security of the hashed data, and an attacker can compute the original message block by taking the logarithm of the hash for that block. Third, it can be shown that the data aggregation scheme presented in [23] is vulnerable to collusion attacks. In this case, when the aggregator (DC in [23] ) colludes with a smart meter SM 2 , then the aggregator can know the usage data of another smart meter SM 1 , which is a serious privacy issue. Apart from [20] - [23] , a maskingbased multi-hop data aggregation scheme has been proposed in [24] . During data aggregation, each smart meter needs to select n proxies and add masking values to meter readings. Proxies remove these masking values to obtain an aggregated reading. However, this scheme is difficult to implement in practice, cannot ensure the integrity protection of the usage report, and does not provide sender authentication. Recently, Baloglu and Demir [37] proposed a solution that combines masking using noise with Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) based encryption, where DDH is used for the encryption of the noisy usage data. In their scheme, metering data is transmitted to at least two aggregators to maintain the integrity and to increase the reliability. This solution incurs high setup and communication cost. Moreover, the proposed solution in [37] cannot ensure sender authentication and consumer's privacy properties.
Motivation: Even though several solutions have been proposed for privacy-preserving data aggregation in smart grids, most of the existing works are based on computationally expensive operations such as homomorphic encryption etc. These are not suitable for resource constrained smart meters, which typically have limited computational capability. For example, a smart meter from Atmel's family with ARM Cortex-M4 processor can provide a maximum CPU speed of 780 MHz [33] . As such, this smart meter may not be suitable to perform any computationally expensive operations. Also, since smart grid systems are mostly operated in a large scale, computationally expensive operations may impair the efficiency of the system. Besides, homomorphic encryption based differential privacy does not guarantee the correct summation result [23] . On the other hand, existing masking-based approaches suffer from the following weaknesses:
• In existing masking-based approaches, a smart meter is not authenticated during data aggregation. In other words, the identity and the legitimacy of the smart meters are not verified. Consequently, a dishonest or fake smart meter may falsify the data, which will cause an inaccurate aggregated result.
• In existing masking-based schemes, computationally expensive operations such as DDH group and Bilinear mapping, or homomorphic hashing are used for verifying the correctness of the masking secrets, which are not suitable for the resource-limited smart meters.
• None of the existing schemes (including homomorphicencryption-based schemes) ensure anonymity of the consumer. In this case, each smart meter reveals it's identity, which is fixed for all transactions. Therefore, an adversary can easily understand that the usage data is from the same consumer's end and reveal the consumer's activity through HDA attacks [25] .
B. Our Contribution
This paper first proposes a spatial data aggregation scheme which provides up-to-date and accurate aggregated consumption information to the power grid about any group of consumers. Subsequently, we propose a secure billing solution. In this regard, we only utilize lightweight cryptographic primitives like one-way hash functions, exclusive-or operations, etc. In the proposed scheme, no information about the individual consumers is disclosed. However, the power grid can still monitor the total amount of power needed by its customers situated in a specific region or locality, without compromising the privacy of any individual customer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we explain the underlying smart grid model, security goals, and the preliminaries that are relevant to this article. In Section III, we present the proposed spatial data aggregation scheme with a secure billing solution for smart grids. Security of the proposed scheme is analyzed in Section IV. In Section V, we formally analyze the privacy of our proposed scheme. A discussion on the performance of the proposed scheme is given in Section VI. Finally, the conclusion is drawn is Section VII. The symbols and cryptographic functions used in this paper are defined in Table I. II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY GOALS In this section, we first briefly describe the network architecture of the proposed privacy-preserving data aggregation mechanisms for smart grids and also present the adversary model. Subsequently, we define the security goals of the proposed scheme. Figure 1 shows the system model considered in the paper for smart grid metering, which also forms the foundation of the proposed data aggregation scheme. Our system model consists of four major entities: a power supplier (PS), a thirdparty aggregator (TPA) employed by the power supplier, a set of smart meters (SMs), and numerous home area networks (HANs). In our system model, the PS is responsible for the distribution of electricity to each HAN. The TPA periodically aggregates the electricity consumption of a group of HANs in a geographical region, and provides the data to the PS. The PS may use this data to adjust its electricity prices for demandside management and also to provide appropriate feedback to its power generating stations or suppliers. In this way, the TPA plays a crucial role in maintaining the balance between power production and demand. Each HAN is composed of a SM and a set of home appliances. The SM sends its periodic readings to the TPA through an in-home network (e.g. WiFi). The TPA and PS communicate through the public Internet (a cellular network based Internet access is shown as an example in Figure 1) .
A. System Model
B. Adversary Model
In our adversary model we consider the PS as a trusted organization (e.g. owned by the government, such as Singapore Power in Singapore and National Grid in the United Kingdom). On the other hand, the TPA is owned by a private company whose main responsibility is to assist the PS. Therefore, in our system model we consider the TPA as a honestbut-curious entity, who may want to know the consumption data of each HAN and subsequently may try to sell the usage information to another company, e.g. for marketing materials for home appliances. On the other hand, here we assume that various elements inside the core network may also act as adversaries and be interested in private details of the power consumption of each HAN. A compromised network and its various elements (like a router or a switch) may alter or fabricate the meter's consumption data. Hence, any communication through the network may not be secure. Also, any SM may be the adversary and be interested to know the consumption data of another SM from a different HAN. An outside attacker may also try to impersonate as a legitimate entity (e.g. a SM or the TPA) to send data under its name. For instance, a dishonest or fake SM could falsify the data for causing inaccurate aggregation result. In addition, the outside attacker may eavesdrop on the network transmission media for obtaining the power consumption data and may also try to alter or re-transmit them.
C. Security Goals
• Authentication: Before aggregating any data, the TPA needs to authenticate each SM. This will prevent any inaccurate aggregation results. Similarly, before obtaining any relevant information from the PS through the insecure public communication channel, the TPA needs to authenticate the PS.
• Usage Data Confidentiality: The secrecy of the end-toend communication during meter data collection is vital. Therefore, the electricity consumption data is required to be kept secret from any third party for protecting the privacy of the customer. In this regard, even if an outside or an inside adversary like other SMs from different HANs or the TPA obtains the messages with electricity consumption information, then he/she should not be able to comprehend the encrypted message.
• Usage Data Integrity: The TPA should be able to verify the integrity of the data received from the SM of each HAN. Similarly, the TPA needs to verify the integrity of the relevant information received from the PS during data aggregation.
• Consumer Privacy: The TPA should not be able to know the real identity of a HAN user. Only the PS should have the ability to know a consumer's real identity. In addition, after eavesdropping the usage data, an outside adversary should not be able to comprehend that the data is from a particular consumer or if two meter readings are from the same user.
III. PROPOSED PRIVACY-FRIENDLY SPATIAL DATA AGGREGATION SCHEME
In this section, we propose our privacy-friendly spatial data aggregation scheme for smart grids, which consists of two phases: authenticated initialization and data aggregation. Assume that there are n HANs in a locality which obtain their power supply from the PS. In the authenticated initialization phase, smart meter SM i and the aggregator TPA prove their legitimacy to the PS and subsequently establish a key kh i and a set of temporary identities between them. Besides, this phase also helps both the SM i and the TPA to update their secret key kh i and establish a new set of temporary identities. In the data aggregation phase, the TPA periodically aggregates the electricity consumption of a group of HANs in a locality without knowing the power consumption of each individual HAN.
A. Authenticated Initialization
Consider the scenario where the PS is interested in the aggregated power consumption of a group of n HANs that are its customers. During the installation of the smart meter SM i of each household HAN i , the PS randomly generates a pseudo identity PID i and a secret key k i using the meter's pseudo random number generator (PRNG) and assigns them to SM i . The PS records PID i and k i for future communication with SM i . This phase of the proposed scheme consists of the following steps:
Step AU1: The smart meter SM i generates a random number N s and calculates V 0 = h(PID i ||N s ||k i ). Then, SM i composes a message M A 1 : {PID i , N s , V 0 } and sends it to the TPA.
Step AU2: After receiving the request message M A 1 , the TPA generates a nonce N a and calculates a hash-integrity output
} and sends it to the PS.
Step AU3: Upon receiving message M A 2 , the PS tries to map the identity PID i to the real identity of a user, and then computes and verifies V 0 and V 1 . If the verification is successful then the PS generates a new pseudo identity PID new i and computes
, and V 3 = h(T ||y||z||k i ). After that, the PS composes a response message M A 3 : {x, y, z, V 2 , V 3 } and sends it to the TPA.
Step AU4: After receiving the response message M A 3 , the TPA first computes and validates the parameter V 2 . If the validation is successful, then the TPA first calculates TK = x ⊕ h(K as ||N a ) and kh i = h (TK||N a ||N s ) Figure 2 .
B. Data Aggregation
Our data aggregation process consists of the following steps:
Step AG1: To maintain proper balance between power production and demand, the power supplier PS periodically (say, every 1 or 2 hours) needs to know the electricity consumption of the group of n HANs. In order to do that, for each time interval T j , the PS picks a set of n random integers R j = {r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n } from a cryptographic pseudo random number generator that fully exploits the range {0, · · · , d − 1} of a uniform distribution, where d n i=1 M i , where M i is the meter reading of SM i . Hereafter, the PS selects a random integer r i ∈ R j for each smart meter SM i and
In this way, for all smart meters of n HANs, the PS derives ( * , H * ) = Figure 3 .
{(
Step AG2: After obtaining the random integer r i , SM i generates a timestamp t i and selects an unused temporary identity tid ij ∈ TID iq and calculates its blinded measurement
, composes a message {tid ij , X i , H i , t i }, and sends it to the TPA. Finally, SM i deletes tid ij from TID iq . Once all the temporary identities are used up, SM i needs to ask for a new set from the TPA. In that case, SM i and the TPA execute the authenticated initialization phase again. Now, upon receiving the usage data from each smart meter, the TPA first locates and validates the temporary identity tid ij and key-hash integrity output H i . If the validation is successful, the TPA computes
In this way, the TPA obtains the aggregated power consumption data of n HANs. Details of this step are shown in Figure 4 . Note that if any check in the aforementioned steps is invalid, then this phase of the proposed scheme is aborted. Also, to ensure more efficient performance of the above data aggregation scheme, the PS can pre-compute R * = {( * , H * )||(R Sum , PS )} for several sessions and send them to the TPA. In this way, we can expedite the data aggregation process. Now, for the correctness of our protocol, all the smart meters need to participate during the data aggregation process. To avoid the failure report problem (i.e. the absence of reports when a smart meter fails), the TPA needs to do ping tests with the smart meters on a regular basis. In case the TPA does not receive any response from smart meter SM i , it informs the PS to take necessary actions. In this context, the PS first abstains from creating any r i for that particular smart meter and then initiates technical support steps to resolve the issue.
Privacy Enhancement Under Collusion: In the system model considered so far, the PS is assumed to be a trusted entity (e.g. owned by the government). However, this assumption may not be valid for all scenarios. In this context, if the PS colludes with the the TPA, then the TPA will be able to know the individual measurements of the smart meters. However, this issue can be easily addressed with a few changes to the proposed scheme. In this regard, some changes are required in step AG2 of the proposed scheme. In this new scenario, we assume that each smart meter can directly communicate with its neighboring smart meters and each meter SM i has a secure line with its adjacent neighbor SM i+1 . Now, after obtaining the masking value r i from the TPA, each smart meter SM i picks a random number s i (called its "share") from a large space and adds this share to its measurement value M i yielding X i , i.e., X i = M i + s i + r i mod d, which is then sent directly to the TPA. Additionally, SM i adds s i to the accumulated share value S i−1 that it has received from SM i−1 and calculates S i = s i + S i−1 . SM i then sends S i to its next adjacent neighbor SM i+1 through the secure line. This continues up to the last smart meter SM n which computes S n = S n−1 + s n , which equals n i=1 s i . Finally, SM n encrypts S n and the timestamp t n with kh n and sends it to the TPA. The TPA computes
which gives the desired aggregated load. The details of the revised step AG2 are depicted in Figure 5 .
C. Secure Billing
We assume that each smart meter SM i maintains a parameter β i for billing. Initially, during meter installation, the value of β i is set to 0. Now, for each time interval T j , when SM i sends its blinded measurement X i to the TPA for spatial data aggregation, then SM i also updates β i = M Then the PS defines an acknowledgment ACK i and generates a timestamp t * and a valid key-hash response λ = h(ACK i ||k i ||t * ), and subsequently sends (ACK i , λ, t * ) to SM i through the TPA. When SM i receives the acknowledgment ACK i , it first checks the timestamp t * and and the keyhash response λ. If they are valid, then SM i informs its owner and sets β i to 0; otherwise, it requests the PS for the acknowledgment.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section demonstrates that the proposed scheme ensures all the security goals listed in Section II.
A. Accomplishment of Authentication
In the authenticated initialization phase of the proposed scheme, the PS authenticates SM i by verifying the pseudo identity PID i and the parameter V 0 in request message M A 2 , where only a legitimate SM i can generate the valid key-hash output V 0 . The PS authenticates the TPA by using the request parameter V 1 , which must be equal to h (ID A ||N a ||K as ) . On the other hand, both SM i and the TPA authenticate the PS by using the response parameters V 2 and V 3 , respectively. Now, in the data aggregation phase of the proposed scheme, before aggregating the usage data, the TPA authenticates each smart meter SM i by using the timestamp t i and the response H i . Moreover, Fig. 5 . Pictorial presentation of the revised step AG2 for addressing collusion attacks between PS and TPA in this phase of the proposed scheme, the TPA authenticates the PS by using hash-response parameter H P S . Furthermore, in the proposed data aggregation scheme, if an adversary tries to perform any replay attempt, the receiving end can easily comprehend such activities by using the timestamps t i , t a , and t ps . On the other hand, during the billing phase, if an adversary (even TPA) attempts to forge the billing value β i , then the PS will be able to detect that by using the key-hash response ν i . In this way, the proposed scheme can detect any forgery attacks..
B. Accomplishment of Secure Key-Establishment
In the authenticated initialization phase of the proposed data aggregation scheme, each smart meter SM i and the TPA need to securely establish a key kh i , which will protect against dishonest or fake smart meters from falsifying data. In this regard, only the legitimate TPA who knows the secret key K as can calculate TK = x ⊕ h(K as ||N a ) and kh i = h (TK||N a ||N s ) . Similarly, only an authentic smart meter SM i with the installed secret key ||T||N s ) , and kh i = h (TK||N a ||N s ) . Therefore, the security of the shared secret key kh i depends on the secrecy of the keys K as and k i , where it is assumed that the respective entities (PS, TPA, and SM i ) will not reveal their shared secret to anyone.
C. Accomplishment of Usage Data Confidentiality
The amount electricity usage in HAN i is blinded with the random integer r i from a large space, i.e., X i = M i +r i mod d. Therefore, the TPA can only know the blinded measurement of each SM i . Besides, after calculating n i=1 X i −R Sum , the TPA can only obtain the aggregated spatial (i.e., a group of HANs') usage data. This prevents analysis of a single customer's data. Also, since the masking integer r i is chosen randomly, even if the usage of electricity for two consumers is the same, an adversary (even the TPA) cannot comprehend it from the blinded measurements. Thus, the pattern of the electricity consumption is protected from detection by any eavesdropper. Furthermore, for ensuring privacy under collusion attacks between the PS and the TPA, each smart meter SM i uses a random share s i for obtaining X i , i.e., X i = M i +s i +r i mod d. Therefore, even if the PS and the TPA collude, since they do not know the value of s i , they will not be able to obtain the desired M i . Hence, the proposed scheme can ensure privacy even under collusion attacks.
D. Accomplishment of Usage Data Integrity
In the proposed scheme, before doing data aggregation, the TPA first checks whether it has received the same data as that was sent by each smart meter SM i . For that, the TPA computes H * i = h(X i ||kh i ||t i ) and checks whether H * i is equal to H i or not. This approach facilitates the detection of any manipulation of the aggregated usage data during communication.
E. Accomplishment of Consumer Privacy
In the proposed data aggregation scheme, no one except for the PS can gain knowledge of any private information such as the real-identity of a HAN user. The TPA only knows the pseudo identity PID i of an user based on which it accumulates the reading of each smart meter SM i . We also note that while sending the usage data, SM i is not allowed to use the same temporary identity tid ij twice. No one except the TPA can recognize that. Therefore, an outsider cannot guess whether the usage data for two consecutive sessions are from the same HAN. This approach of the proposed scheme is useful for achieving privacy against eavesdropper (PAE) [32] .
V. FORMAL PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally analyze the privacy of the proposed scheme.
A. Privacy Model
We now consider Ouafi and Phan's privacy model [29] . In this model, attacker A can eavesdrop on all the channels between the smart meters and TPA and he/she can also perform any active or passive attacks. A is allowed to run the following queries:
• Execute (M, T PA, i ): This query represents the passive attacks. In this context, the attacker can eavesdrop all the transmitted messages between the smart meter M and the aggregator T PA in the i -th session. Consequently, the attacker obtains all the exchanged data between the T PA and meter M.
• Send(U, V, m, i ): This query models the active attacks in the system. In this query, attacker A has the permission to impersonate an aggregator U in the i -th session, and forwards a message m to a smart meter V . Besides, the attacker has the permission to block the exchanged message m between the smart meter and the aggregator.
• Corrupt(M, K ): In this query, the attacker A has the permission to access secret information K stored in the smart meter's memory.
This query is the only query that does not correspond to any of A's abilities or any real-world event. This query allows to define the indistinguishabilitybased notion of untraceable privacy. If the party has accepted and is being asked a Test query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given M b from the set {M 0 , M 1 }. Informally, A succeeds if it can guess the bit b. In order for the notion to be meaningful, a Test session must be fresh in the sense of Definition 2.
Definition 1 (Partnership and Session Completion):
An aggregator instance T PA j and a meter instance M i are partners if, and only if, both have output Accept(M i ) and Accept(T PA j ), respectively, signifying the completion of the protocol session.
Definition 2 (Freshness): A party instance is fresh at the end of execution if, and only if (i) it has output Accept with or without a partner instance and (ii) both the instance and its partner instance (if such a partner exists) have not been sent a Corrupt query.
Definition 3 (Indistinguishable Privacy (INDPriv)):
It is defined using the game G played between a malicious adversary A and a collection of smart meters and reader and aggregator instances. A runs the game G whose setting is as follows.
• Learning phase: A is able to send any Execute and Send query and interact with the aggregator T PA and smart meter M 0 and M 1 that is chosen randomly. Proof: In the proposed scheme, each meter reading is masked with a new random integer r j . Besides, the temporary identity TID changes in each session. Therefore, it is difficult for an adversary to perform any traceability attack by performing the following phases:
• Learning phase:: In the j -th round, the attacker A sends an Execute query (T PA, M 0 , j ) and obtains the parameters {tid 
, and h(·) is ansecure pseudorandom function, the adversary thus needs to make a random guess. In this context, the advantage of the adversary at recognizing M 0 or M 1 can be denoted by Adv INDPriv
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
The objective of the proposed spatial data aggregation scheme is not only to fulfill several security requirements for smart meters, but also to ensure that the computational overhead during the data aggregation process is reasonable. To manifest the advantages of the proposed scheme, in this section, we first compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the following previously proposed non-maskingbased data aggregation schemes for smart grids: [4] , [5] , [10] - [12] , [18] , [19] , [35] , and [36] . Table II shows the security TABLE II   PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKING BASED ON SECURITY PROPERTIES WITH RESPECT TO NON-MASKING-BASED SOLUTIONS   TABLE III COMPUTATION COST OF DIFFERENT CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS properties that each scheme supports, and we can see that the proposed scheme and the schemes presented in [20] , [22] , and [37] can guarantee data confidentiality but [10] cannot. In this regard, during data aggregation, the scheme presented in [10] reveals the consumer's usage profile to the aggregator and the outside adversary. Table II also shows that the some of these schemes do not support data integrity during data aggregation. This allows an adversary to alter the usage data and cause an incorrect aggregated result without the aggregator detecting it. Next, from Table II we see that most of these nonmasking-based schemes do not support sender authentication. As a result, a dishonest or fake smart meter may falsify the usage data, leading to an incorrect aggregation outcome. In [19] , Jo et al. have proposed two data aggregation schemes, only one of which ensures sender authentication (discussed in Section IA). Hence, [19] only partially supports sender authentication. Furthermore, almost all of the existing schemes allow the transmission of the identity of a smart meter in plain-text. As a result, an outside attacker can target the smart meter of a particular HAN and reveal the consumer's behavior through HDA attacks. Hence, these schemes cannot ensure a consumer's privacy. Sui et al. [12] have considered this issue and designed their scheme with the assumption of an anonymity network. However, their scheme needs to bear the additional computational overhead for establishing such a network.
To show the effectiveness of our proposed scheme with respect to the existing non-masking-based schemes, we conducted simulations of the cryptographic operations used by various schemes on an Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine with an Intel Core i5-4300 dual-core 2.60 GHz CPU (operating as the TPA or the PS as per the scheme). To simulate a smart meter, we used a single-core 798 MHz CPU with 256 MB of RAM, which reflects the capabilities of real smart meters. The simulations used the JPBC library Pbc-0.5.14 [26] , JCE [27] , and the Paillier library libpaillier-0. 8 [28] to evaluate the execution time of different cryptographic operations. Table III shows the computation time of the cryptographic operations for 768 bits of data. From Table III , we can see that SHA-256 leads to significantly lower computation cost as compared to other primitives, and hence is better suited for resource constrained smart meters. Table IV shows the variation in the aggregation time for different numbers of SMs in the proposed scheme, Paillier homomorphic encryption-based schemes ( [4] , [5] , [18] and [19] ), pairing-based schemes ( [10] , [12] ), [36] ) and ECDSA signature-based schemes ( [11] , [19] ), [35] ). It can be seen from Table IV that the aggregation time is significantly lower in the proposed scheme as compared to the others.
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with existing masking-based aggregation schemes for smart grids: [20] - [23] , and [37] . Table V shows the security properties that each scheme supports, and we can see that our proposed scheme and the schemes presented in [20] , [22] , [37] can guarantee data confidentiality, while the schemes presented in [21] and [23] cannot. In [21] , the TPA is allowed to know the individual meter readings (discussed in Section IA). The [23] can only ensure data confidentiality when the aggregator (DC in [23] ) does not collude with a smart meter (discussed in Section IA). Hence, we say that the scheme presented in [23] can partially ensure data confidentiality. Table V also shows that although most of the maskingbased schemes (except [22] ) can ensure data integrity, they do not authenticate the sender (smart meter) during the data aggregation process. Consequently, a dishonest or fake smart meter may falsify the data, leading to an inaccurate aggregated result. Moreover, similar to the existing non-masking-based schemes, the schemes presented in [20] - [23] and [37] allow the smart meters to send their identity in plain-text. Hence, these schemes cannot ensure security under HDA attacks. On the other hand, the proposed scheme ensures data integrity and sender authentication through one-way non-collision hash functions. In addition, smart meters use their temporary identities during the data aggregation process, and meters are not allowed to use a temporary identity more than once. Thus, an attacker cannot isolate or identify the information from any specific HAN.
Next, we compare the existing masking-based schemes and our scheme with respect to masking and data integrity methodologies. From Table VI, we can see that both the proposed scheme and the scheme presented in [23] use the same approach of masking, where the masking random values are generated from a cryptographic pseudo random number generator. Table VI also shows that the proposed scheme uses the normal secure one-way hash-function for verifying the masking data integrity. On the other hand, existing maskingbased schemes use computationally expensive operations such as decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman, homomorphic hashing etc. for the same purpose, which result in high computational [23] scheme. In this context, we conduct simulations of the cryptographic operations used in [23] (such as homomorphic hashing) on the same platform that we used for the performance evaluation of the non-maskingbased schemes: an Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine with an Intel Core i5-4300 dual-core 2.60 GHz CPU (operating as the TPA) and a single core 798 MHz CPU and 256 MB of RAM (operating as a smart meter). The simulations used the GNU MP library and the JCE library [27] to evaluate the execution time of the cryptographic operations such as homomorphic hashing, and naive one-way non-collision hash function (SHA-256). Figure 6 shows the aggregation time as a function of the number of SMs for the proposed scheme and [23] for aggregating 768 bits of data. In this regard, for ensuring data integrity support of 768 bits of data for 200 smart meters, the homomorphic hashing used in [23] takes 88.83 ms and naive one-way non-collision hash function (used in our proposed scheme) takes only 23.29 ms. The masking time is 0.77 ms for both schemes. It can be seen from Figure 6 that the aggregation time is significantly lower in the proposed scheme as compared to others. Hence, the proposed scheme can be used for efficient data aggregation in smart grids.
A. Computation Cost During Billing
In our billing phase, each smart meter needs to perform one symmetric-key encryption (AES-CBC) and one hash operation, which takes an additional 0.79 + 0.43 = 1.22 ms. The TPA needs to perform one symmetric-key encryption and one symmetric-key decryption operation, which takes 0.31 + 0.42 = 0.73 ms. The PS needs to perform one symmetric-key decryption and two hash operations which take 0.42 + 2 × 0.12 = 0.66 ms. Therefore, the overall computation cost for the billing phase is 2.61 ms. Table VII shows a detailed analysis of the complexity for our data aggregation scheme where N denotes the number of smart meters. The complexity value is given for both the smart meters and the TPA. Here, the operations conducted in each smart meter is of constant complexity and the smart meters can do their operations in parallel. For the TPA, the complexity increases linearly with the number of smart meters. Generally, while smart meters have limited computational capabilities, the TPA will have powerful computational resources, and thus the proposed scheme scales well with the size of the grid.
B. Complexity of the Proposed Scheme
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a lightweight and privacy-friendly spatial data aggregation scheme for securely obtaining the power demand in a smart grid. Security of the proposed scheme is analyzed to confirm its robustness against known attacks. In addition, the privacy of individual meter readings is analyzed under the honest-but-curious adversary model. Performance analysis of the proposed scheme with existing data aggregation schemes shows that the proposed scheme has significantly lower computational cost as compared to other approaches and is hence the best option for smart grid environments.
